How to fi nance social safety nets at scale sustainably is a pressing issue for policy makers. Th is report argues that bringing social safety nets to scale is key to responding to the challenges of chronic poverty and vulnerability to shocks across the region. However, governments across the world, but especially in Africa, face competing fi scal demands and fi nite budgets.
Financing social safety net programs at scale in Africa is therefore a challenge. Rising to the challenge requires resolving both sides of the fi scal equation: expenditure and revenue. Th at means spending resources more eff ectively and boosting revenue. Considering social protection expenditure and revenue issues jointly boosts the likelihood of achieving revenue suffi ciency for sustained programs.
Spending and Financing for Social Safety Nets: A Snapshot
Chapter 1 highlights the main traits of spending on social safety nets in the region. On average, the region devotes 1.2 percent of GDP on social safety nets (equivalent to 4.6 percent of total government spending), compared with the global average of 1.6 percent. Th is is lower than the spending on other sectors, such as energy subsidies, health care, education, and, in some cases, the military (fi gure 5.1; appendix G, table G.1). In particular, spending on energy subsidiesoft en cited as a means of supporting vulnerable households, but largely regressive in practice-is greater than spending on social safety nets in the region, with particularly high levels in Central and Eastern Africa and in low-income countries.
Th ere is great variation across the Africa region in spending on social safety nets as a share of GDP. High-income and upper-middle-income countries spend an average of 2.5 and 2.2 percent of GDP (6.5 and 6.9 percent of total government expenditures, respectively), while low-income countries spend an average 1.4 percent of GDP (4.8 percent of total government expenditures; see fi gure 5.1 and appendix G, table G.3). Southern African countries spend an average 3.2 percent of GDP, three times more than countries in other subregions. Nonresource-rich countries devote more than twice as much to social safety nets (2.1 percent of GDP) as resource-rich countries (1 percent of GDP). Countries with lower exposure to droughts allocate fewer resources to these programs than countries facing high or medium exposure (appendix G, table G.3) .
Th e composition of social safety net spending also varies. Overall, cash transfer programs account for 41 percent of all social safety net spending in Africa (chapter 1, fi gure 1.4, and appendix G, table G.6). Social pensions represent the second-highest share of spending (26 percent of total). In Southern Africa and upper-middle-or high-income countries, a larger share of social safety net spending goes to programs focused on the elderly. Spending on public 
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C e n t r a l A f r i c a Overall works programs represents 16 percent of all safety net spending in Africa; these programs exist in almost all low-income countries and fragile states. While overall poverty-targeted programs account for the majority of spending in the region, most of the social safety net spending in Central Africa and West Africa is categorically targeted (chapter 3, fi gure 3.4, and appendix G, table G.6). Current spending is inadequate for confronting the high poverty rates and vulnerability to shocks in the region. Many of the poor do not have access to social safety net programs. Average coverage is 10 percent of the total population, while the average poverty rate is above 41 percent (appendix F, table F.2; chapter 1, fi gure 1.1). If one assumes that the targeting of social safety net interventions is perfect, this implies that around 24 percent of the poor are covered. Most countries in Africa spend much less on social safety nets than the aggregate poverty gap, which is, on average, 14 percent of GDP, while social safety net spending is 1.2 percent of GDP (see chapter 1). 1 Only upper-middle-income countries, some lower-middle-income countries, and countries in Southern Africa spend amounts on social safety nets that more or less match the poverty gap.
In terms of effi ciency, the available data show that administrative costs represent an average 17 percent of program spending (appendix G, table G.9). Th is refl ects the cost of the initial investments in systems and the small size of many programs. Th ough there are data limitations, the share of administrative costs appears to be lower in public works, school feeding, and social pension programs, possibly because of less costly targeting approaches. Administrative costs tend to fall, but not always, as programs increase in size. Th e administrative costs of the Social Safety Nets Project in Cameroon accounted for 65 percent of program spending at launch in 2015, but fell to 23 percent in 2016, while the number of benefi ciaries quadrupled (fi gure 5.2). In Mali, the administrative costs of the Jigisemejiri (Tree of Hope) Safety Nets Project fell from 41.8 percent to 11.9 percent of program costs in 2014-16, while the number of benefi ciaries grew from about 30,000 people to over 375,000 people. Th e administrative costs of the Mozambique Basic Social Subsidy Program decreased slightly when benefi ts were raised. However, expansion does not necessarily lead to immediate savings if new networks and systems need to be developed for geographic expansion, as occurred in the Tanzania Productive Social Safety Net (appendix G, table G.9).
On average, development partners fi nance 55 percent and governments the remaining 45 percent of social safety net spending in Africa (chapter 3, fi gure 3.3). Interventions supported by development partners oft en prioritize food-based programs, such as school feeding, food for work, and vouchers (appendix G, table G.8, presents detailed information for selected programs). Humanitarian aid represents the main source of funding in emergency situations, and development partners remain critical in many low-income and fragile contexts ( chapter 1, fi gure 1.12). Th e average amount of humanitarian aid fl owing to fragile and confl ict-aff ected countries (3.9 percent of GDP) is larger than the social safety net spending of the governments of these countries (1.4 percent of GDP). Th e Central African Republic and South Sudan are the largest recipients of humanitarian aid (21.6 and 11.3 percent of GDP, respectively), followed by Burundi, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Mali, Niger, and Sierra Leone (appendix G, table G.1).
Making Better Use of Existing Resources
Maximizing the effi ciency and eff ectiveness of social safety net programs is paramount given the tight fi scal environments and competing demands. For the purposes of this study, the general concept of effi ciency refl ects the achievement of desired outcomes at the lowest possible cost, while the concept of eff ectiveness encompasses the achievement of the highest possible impact for a given budget. Desired outcomes and impacts depend on policy goals and preferences, country context, and specifi c programs. For example, the desired outcome of a particular cash transfer program could be limited to the immediate reduction of monetary poverty, while that of other programs might include enhancing the human capital of children, social cohesion, or resilience to natural disasters. (Th e discussion below mostly focuses on impact in terms of monetary poverty reduction because of the nature of the available data and the goal of facilitating crosscountry comparisons.) Box 5.1 off ers a more detailed discussion of the defi nition and measurement of effi ciency and eff ectiveness in social safety nets used in this report.
B O X 5 . 1
How Are Effi ciency and Effectiveness Defi ned and Measured?
The concepts of effi ciency and effectiveness represent ways to gauge inputs, outputs, and outcomes (Farrell 1957) . The defi nitions of the inputs, outputs, and outcomes of social safety net programs depend on the policy goals and parameters of each program. The outputs and outcomes of cash transfer programs might relate to child poverty, school attendance, earnings, and so on depending on the program objectives. Defi ning the relationship between these variables is challenging, given that most social outcomes are the result of many factors and not a single policy. Empirically, measurement is also often diffi cult because appropriate data are often not available or are of poor quality.
The social protection literature presents multiple approaches to measuring effi ciency and effectiveness (Bui et al. 2015; Castro-Leal et al. 1999; Galang, Lavado, and Domingo 2013; Herrmann et al. 2008; Mandl, Dierx, and Ilzkovitz 2008; Nelson 2012; Sudaram, Strokova, and Vandeninden 2014) . The two main ones are the analysis of performance indicators and frontier analysis. Performance indicators include metrics such as the coverage and targeting of the poor, benefi t incidence analysis, poverty reduction decomposition, and cost-effectiveness analysis. However, these do not include information on the maximum possible achievements, the yardsticks at the core of effi ciency analysis. In contrast, frontier analysis provides a benchmark to assess effi ciency and effectiveness by building a production possibility frontier based on cross-country data. There are multiple techniques to estimate a production possibility frontier, either parametric (Free Disposal Hull, Data Envelopment Analysis) or nonparametric (econometric methods such as Stochastic Frontier Analysis).
Results of the parametric data envelopment analysis are presented below to illustrate the kind of analysis that may be performed, though this is by no means an exhaustive examination of social safety nets' effi ciency and effectiveness. The methodology estimates the highest possible level of output that can be reached for a (continued next page) given level of spending (called effectiveness in this methodology), based on the performance of other countries (Farrell 1957) . Figure B5 .1.1 shows the frontier calculated using social safety net spending as a share of GDP as an input and coverage of the poor as an output (other inputs and outputs could be used). The vertical distance of a country to the frontier shows how much a country could increase its coverage of the poor, keeping constant its current spending level. Effectiveness scores measure how close a country is to the frontier (calculated as [d1/ (d1+d2)] for Lesotho in the graph). Th e ability of programs to reduce poverty varies widely. Among others, programs' impact on poverty depends on their ability to reach the poor. For instance, while $0.72 of each dollar transferred to households by Rwanda's VUP Direct support program goes to the poor, this is only the case for $0.06 of each dollar transferred by the noncontributory pension in Mauritius (table 5.1). Programs' ability to reduce poverty also depends on the number of benefi ciaries. In 2014, Rwanda's VUP Direct Support program only reached 1.1 percent of the population, while the noncontributory pension in Mauritius' coverage was 15.5 percent. Impact depends also on the value of transfers, and their ability to bring households above the poverty line (transfers represent about 22 percent of benefi ciaries' consumption for the VUP Direct support program, and 27 percent for Mauritius's program). Th erefore, Rwanda's VUP Direct support program performs well in terms of reaching the poor and providing them with relatively large transfers, but its impact on poverty is limited by its limited coverage. In Mauritius, the noncontributory pension has large impacts on poverty, but is a costly program, as transfers are large and many are not reaching the poor.
Overall, there is signifi cant room to improve the eff ectiveness of social safety net spending in many countries. Th e frontier analysis described in box 5.1 shows that most countries can signifi cantly improve their eff ectiveness by increasing their coverage of the poor while maintaining their current level of spending. Generally, countries with a strong social safety net system; with a central institution leading policy setting, oversight, and coordination; and with large social registries tend to be more eff ective (box 5.1, table B5.1.1). On the other hand, the presence of development partners and of a social protection strategy is negatively associated with eff ectiveness; this probably refl ects lower eff ectiveness observed in poorer or fragile countries, where development partners and strategies are also more present. While these measures should only be taken as indicative, they suggest signifi cant potential effi ciency gains for many countries' programs.
Strong Delivery Mechanisms Are the Basis for an Effi cient System
Well-functioning administrative tools are critical to ensuring the cost-eff ective delivery of social safety net transfers to the intended benefi ciaries, and governments across the world have begun to emphasize improving administrative processes and systems. Th e essential elements of the eff ective administration of a social safety net system include processes for identifi cation, targeting, enrollment, payments, service delivery, and case management. Th e government of South Africa achieved significant effi ciency gains by overhauling administration, by introducing a specialized agency for centralized administration and payments (the South African Social Security Agency), by introducing biometric smart cards, by reregistering benefi ciaries, and by undertaking regular biometric proof-of-life verifi cations (notwithstanding recent controversies surrounding the arrangements regarding the payment systems) (Alam, Mokate, and Plangemann 2016) . Upgrading administrative processes and introducing technology can be costly, but the benefi ts can be signifi cant in the medium to long terms. During the fi rst seven years of Mexico's Prospera Program, administrative costs fell from 51 percent of the program's overall budget to 6 percent. Th is was because of large up-front investments in systems-the purchase of equipment, the design of systems, the defi nition of procedures, and so on-that yielded benefi ts for multiple years, as well as a gradual increase in the number of benefi ciaries served by the systems (Lindert, Skoufi as, and Shapiro 2006) . In Africa, the administrative costs associated with Cameroon's Social Safety Nets Project declined from an initial 60 percent of total spending to 23 percent aft er one year. During the fi rst year of the program, most of the spending was allocated to establishing appropriate information infrastructure; but, aft er the fi rst year, the program implementation unit (PIU) became more effi cient, and benefi t payments became the largest cost item.
Th e adoption of technology in all aspects of administration can lead in lowering the cost of administering social safety net programs. A shift from physical cash transfers to electronic payments generates substantial gains in effi ciency by reducing leakage and allowing the integration of payments with information management. In Mexico, thanks to a campaign to integrate electronic payments and social assistance, 97 percent of 2.6 million pensioners are paid through a centralized electronic system, saving the equivalent of about $900 million annually in administrative costs.
Th e use of biometric smart cards is another example of how technology is able to boost effi ciency by lowering administrative costs. In India, the introduction of biometric smart cards resulted in time savings to benefi ciaries valued at $4.5 million and reduced annual leakage by approximately $38.5 million in the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme and $3.2 million in the social security pension program. Th e effi ciency gains are particularly large relative to the total cost of the introduction of the smart cards, $2.3 million (Muralidharan, Niehaus, and Sukhtankar 2016) .
Technology can also promote eff ectiveness. Th us, through a recent pilot program of the Fundación Capital in Colombia, recipients of the Más Familias en Acción conditional cash transfer program gained access to shared tablet computers and smartphones to use LISTA, an application designed as an alternative to in-person fi nancial training through a peer-to-peer education methodology. Participants were able to access LISTA from home at their own pace and focus their learning on the choice of topics. Preliminary results indicate signifi cant impacts on fi nancial knowledge, attitudes toward formal fi nancial services, the adoption of good fi nancial practices, and fi nancial outcomes.
Technology also holds promise for decreasing the cost and increasing the accuracy of targeting. Th e governments of Sierra Leone and Tanzania are using innovative spatial statistical modeling approaches to targeting. Georeferenced locational information (geotagged and satellite data) is combined with household survey data to generate poverty maps. In Tanzania, the maps are used to assess geographical targeting performance and will be used to select priority areas for retargeting and any eventual expansion of the social safety net program. In Sierra Leone, the maps are used to target multiple programs and are overlaid with other data, depending on the needs of each program; they are also used to help harmonize interventions across governmental and nongovernmental institutions (Gething and Rosas 2015; World Bank 2015) .
Introducing technology does not guarantee cost savings, however. Th e quality of implementation and local conditions play a big role and there is oft en a learning period. In a cash-for-assets program in Kenya, electronic cash payments were 15 percent less costly to implement than the distribution of food of equivalent value (CGAP 2013). However, in the Malawi Cash and Food for Livelihoods Pilot Program, cash was more expensive to administer than food (though it assured greater food security) because the program was able to purchase food at much lower, more stable prices in the context of weak food market integration (Audsley, Halme, and Balzer 2010) .
On the basis of international experiences, three crucial factors may be identifi ed in determining whether technology can raise the effi ciency and eff ectiveness of social safety nets. First, the quality of infrastructure and implementation is critical for the successful introduction of technology. In four cash transfer programs in lowincome settings (Haiti, Kenya, the Philippines, and Uganda), effi ciency gains from the introduction of electronic payments were not immediately realized because of the lack of adequate mobile infrastructure, a high-quality management information system (MIS), technical capacity among administrators, and recipient understanding (CGAP 2014). In Zambia, an innovative mobile technology enumeration and registration system for the Social Cash Transfer Program did not outperform the existing paper system in a small pilot initiative, because of challenges largely "related to an isolated design fl aw in the application, logistical challenges with power and the network, and poor compatibility between the m-tech database and the existing management information system" (IDinsight 2015, 1) .
Second, the start-up costs of technology are high, either because it requires infrastructure investments or because switching technologies implies transaction costs. A review of e-payments for emergency cash transfers in Kenya and Somalia found that the choice of payment modality is not a large determinant of overall costs and that e-payments are not necessarily cheaper than manual payments, oft en because of the higher start-up costs (O'Brien, Hove, and Smith 2013). Nonfi nancial factors (such as timeliness, the burden on benefi ciaries, safety, risk of fraud, and so on) may then be determining factors in the choice of payment modality. An e-voucher pilot initiative of the World Food Programme in Afghanistan found that, although the program was successful in many aspects, costs were not lower than the costs of traditional paper vouchers because of the high costs of monitoring the pilot initiative, costs that would disappear in follow-up phases.
Finally, the legal and procurement aspects of the introduction of technology need to be carefully managed. Contracting information technology service providers entails unique challenges because such services may be based on proprietary source codes or other asymmetric information that can create excessive negotiating or market power among the service providers. Governments are advised to manage this risk carefully through appropriate legal and procurement processes or by relying on open source systems to avoid vendor lock-in. While the South African social assistance identifi cation and payment card is one of the most advanced in the world, the South African Constitutional Court declared, in 2014, that the tender process and, thus, the contract for provision were invalid. Th e contract with the service provider was continued to guarantee service, but the court ruled that the South African Social Security Agency must reopen the tender. Since then, the agency has encountered numerous challenges in attempting to comply with court's fi nding, and the same service provider is still administering payments, despite allegations of abuse of market power through the provision of complementary fi nancial services using personal and biometric data collected through the grants payment system.
By Joining Programs and Tools, a System-Wide Approach May Promote Effi ciency
All programs require basic administrative tools to identify and enroll benefi ciaries, make payments, and manage information (box 5.2). Unifying these administrative tools and systems can lead to economies of scale and result in effi ciency gains. Beyond more effi cient delivery, a system-wide approach also encompasses program and policy integration, which can reduce costs and boost effi ciency. Despite progress in achieving better coordination, social safety net programs in Africa are still largely fragmented, and responsibility for implementation is typically spread over several ministries (chapter 4). Governments can save resources by creating an integrated and coherent social protection system. Th e effi ciency analysis presented above suggests that countries with a social protection strategy embodied in a ministry with a social protection mandate are able to establish a more effi cient nationwide social safety net system. Systems enable governments to respond more effi ciently and eff ectively to poverty and shocks and to promote well-being throughout the life cycle.
B O X 5 . 2

Key Instruments of Social Safety Net Programs and Systems
Social registries support outreach, intake, registration, and the assessment of needs and conditions. Benefi ciary registries and benefi t administration systems support decisions and notifi cation along the delivery chain of a program. If several benefi ciary registries are linked or integrated, they can support coordination across programs. Kenya is taking steps to enhance effi ciency by consolidating some social safety net programs, including the Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVC) Program, the cash transfer for older persons, the cash transfer for persons with severe disabilities, the Hunger Safety Net Program (HSNP), and the World Food Programme's Cash for Assets Program. An integrated benefi ciary registry has been developed, and the new, unifi ed registry has allowed more effi cient program monitoring, reduced double registration, increased transparency and accountability, promoted the effi cient transfer of data, and enhanced the quality of operations.
Unifi ed national identifi cation systems can support social protection systems. Unique identifi ers are needed to integrate social safety net information systems and accomplish the following: (a) facilitate the verifi cation and authentication of the identity of individuals, (b) link individuals to families and households, (c) eliminate duplication among registered individuals, and (d) access other information systems to share data or undertake cross-checks. India's Aadhaar unique identifi cation number is a 12-digit random number issued to residents based on voluntary enrollment. Aadhar has been used in the rollout of several government social safety nets and other social programs. It is the largest biometric authentication system in the world.
Payment systems support the administration and provision of payment services. Linking payment fl ows with other processes is especially critical to ensure the delivery of benefi ts to the intended individuals in a timely manner while minimizing costs. Case management systems support the management of individuals, families, and households participating in one or many programs through needs assessment, service planning and implementation, advocacy, establishing appropriate links with service providers and complementary programs, and monitoring the delivery and use of services, including monitoring conditionalities. Grievance redress mechanisms support eligibility appeals, complaint handling, the engagement of applicants, benefi ciaries and potential benefi ciaries of social programs, and feedback. Business intelligence and analytics support the generation, aggregation, analysis, and visualization of data to inform and facilitate evidence-based policy making and strategic decision support in social programs. Other applications include data mining, report preparation, time series analysis and predictive techniques, online analytical processing, and statistical analysis.
Interoperability protocols for data exchange-including application programming interfaces, web services, enterprise service bus implementation, and connections to a whole-ofgovernment architecture-are also key components of an integrated social protection information system. Within the broader country context of digital governance, integrated social protection information systems interact with numerous other administrative systems-such as national identifi cation systems, civil registries, and tax authoritiesexchanging and cross-checking data across central and subnational governmental entities. The architecture of integrated social protection information systems includes feedback loops between the various information system components, for example, feeding back data on enrollment decisions in a benefi ciary registry to a social registry.
Source: Selected information from World Bank 2017a.
Box 5.2 (continued)
Information systems are a key tool in the implementation of core processes. Th anks to recent improvements in technology, countries have developed methodologies to integrate aspects of program management into MISs. MISs are made up of components that automate various functions of the delivery chain in a complementary manner.
Experience across the world shows that the development of information systems can lead to signifi cant savings. Th e National Database of Social Information of Brazil contains records on 34 types of social security benefi ts among 30 million benefi ciaries, or 16 percent of the population. In 2009, the data were deemed legally suffi cient as proof of eligibility for social security benefi ts, meaning that, if a beneficiary's records are complete, there is no need to provide additional documents attesting to the payment of contributions or the periods of employment. Th is led to a reduction of the time necessary to document a retirement to 30 minutes.
In addition, the unemployment insurance program processes 3.5 million requests per month and uses data from the national database to check in real time whether a person has another job or receives benefi ts. Th e database also provides information on an individual's wages during the last three months worked, which serves as the basis for calculating benefi ts. Benefi ts can be received for up to fi ve months, and, every month, an automatic verifi cation is performed to ensure that the eligibility criteria have been met before the benefi t is paid. In 2013, approximately R$900 million ($385 million) in payments were blocked as result of cross-checking.
Various documented experiences in Eastern Europe show similar success (World Bank 2014). In Kazakhstan, people now receive 578 diff erent services through the e-government portal. Since its launch, more than 77 million electronic services have been provided, including various certifi cates or statements. Th e e-government system has served more than 2.6 million users. In the Kyrgyz Republic, the transition to an automated system for the allocation and payment of social safety nets-the Corporate Information Systems of Social Assistance-has facilitated a signifi cant decrease in the time needed to process cases, from several days to only around two minutes per report. Th e government of Romania is able to carry out cross-checks between social safety nets and external data by using a unique personal identifi cation number in all major national databases (tax administration, social assistance, health care, pensions, and disability). In 2013, these checks led to the recovery of €1.5 million (approximately $1.65 million). Cross matchings are now a regular activity in various social safety net programs and social services. In the Russian Federation, the Moscow city targeted social safety net program switched from paper-based in-kind transfers to an automated system centered on the Moscow Residents Social Card. Th e elderly now receive payments directly on their social cards rather than a box of goods and are able to use the cards like cash in authorized retail stores in Moscow. Th e introduction of this automated system has reduced processing time from weeks to 72 hours.
A reliable public fi nancial management system is a key element in the efficient allocation and eff ective use of social safety net resources. A program that is supported by a reliable, transparent, and accurate public fi nancial management system is more likely to allocate social safety net resources appropriately so that the resources reach eligible benefi ciaries in a timely manner with minimal or no leakage. Such a system also enables the preparation and publication of detailed, precise, and comprehensive reports. Such a system can typically be used to ensure policy-based and consultative budget preparation; eff ective budget execution processes, including the identifi cation and registration of eligible benefi ciaries and the timely transfer of funds to benefi ciaries; accurate and timely reporting of transactions; and high-quality external audits to satisfy parliamentary scrutiny and follow-up. Th e system can support a ministry of fi nance in coding social protection expenditures to allow effi cient and transparent social protection expenditure tracking and analysis.
Enhancing the administrative effi ciency of existing programs can also improve political and public buy-in, thereby facilitating their increase in scale (chapter 3).
A Focus on the Identifi cation of Benefi ciaries
Social safety net programs vary in nature and have diff erent objectives. While poverty reduction is oft en at the core of social safety nets, promoting equity, resilience, and opportunity encompasses a much wider variety of goals (see chapters 1 and 2) . Th e specifi c scope and design of social safety net programs oft en depend on social norms and ideological factors and are therefore contingent on country-specifi c contexts and preferences (see chapter 3). Inevitably, intended benefi ciary groups diff er across countries and programs, and the methods applied by programs to identify intended beneficiaries vary accordingly.
Whatever the specifi c objective of programs, the programs should provide for carefully selecting and monitoring benefi ciaries to maximize the eff ectiveness of spending. Th e availability of national personal identifi cation systems, sound MISs, and common benefi ciary registries across programs is crucial to the identifi cation and management of benefi ciaries and to reducing fraud and errors (box 5.3). In Lesotho, demographic projections suggest that up to 25 percent of the benefi ciaries of old-age pensions might be ineligible (World Bank 2016a) . Th e government is taking action to address this problem by performing periodic cross-checks with other databases (such as the national identifi cation and civil registry database, and the Civil Service Pensions database), introducing regular proof-of-life verifi cation, and implementing a new electronic payment system. Estimates suggest Lesotho could save up to 0.5 percent of GDP annually once these measures are in place.
If the main program objective is poverty reduction, targeting on the basis of poverty (using income, consumption, or welfare indicators) is oft en advocated as a cost-eff ective way to achieve poverty reduction and, more generally, as a way to prioritize among people in allocating scarce resources. Indeed, transfer programs targeted on the basis of poverty (sometimes combined with geographical or categorical targeting) account for the largest share of social safety net expenditures (chapter 1). A number of factors, however, determine whether poverty targeting will improve the cost-eff ectiveness of social safety nets in reducing monetary poverty.
Simulations based on data on Africa and Latin America suggest that incometargeted programs have greater poverty impacts than categorical programs, even if errors in targeting are taken into account (Acosta, Leite, and Rigolini 2011; Guven and Leite 2016) . But, the higher the poverty rate, the lower the need for income targeting, because income targeting and universal approaches yield similar benefi ciary groups. In 15 African countries with high poverty rates, perfect poverty targeting (with transfers only made to the poor) and 
Ways to Combat Fraud and Errors in Social Safety Nets
The effi ciency of social safety nets can be improved by systematically tackling fraud and errors. Fraud involves intentional behavior to defraud a program, while errors refer to unintentional mistakes on behalf of benefi t claimants or program staff. Fraud and errors are inevitable in social safety net programs, and steps taken to reduce them should be cost-effective and strike a balance among prevention, deterrence, and detection.
Irrespective of their size and design, all social safety net programs are prone to fraud and errors, including in countries with more sophisticated systems, more transparent processes, and more robust governance structures. Reducing fraud and errors contributes to greater effi ciency and effectiveness by ensuring that more resources reach the intended benefi ciaries. Combating fraud and errors also helps build public confi dence in and support for social safety net programs by demonstrating that taxpayer money is secure and is being used effi ciently (see chapter 3).
Improving the clarity of business processes and introducing automation in the administration of social safety net programs can provide opportunities for program administrators to institute more advanced and effective strategies to reduce fraud and errors. The level of benefi t fraud in the United Kingdom has fallen by over 60 percent since 2010 as a result of the actions taken by the Department for Work and Pensions, the institution responsible for social protection policy. A cost-benefi t analysis has estimated that for every £1 invested in data matching, the automated system identifi es £24 in irregularities (NAO 2008) . These matching efforts have meant that fraud in the benefi t system accounts for only 0.7 percent of total expenditures.
In Romania, the government decided to strengthen the institutions in charge of combating errors and fraud in 2010 by (a) implementing data matching across databases at the application stage to prevent ineligible households from registering for income or means-tested benefi ts that are intended for low-income households, (b) using risk profi les to target inspections by social inspectors on high-risk cases, and (c) introducing a sanctions policy to deter potential fraudulent claims and recover misspent resources. These efforts focused on large, high-risk programs and were accompanied by improved information technology and organizational structures. In particular, this included a review of the legislation supporting the legal power of social inspectors, a signifi cant increase in the number of these inspectors, the allocation of inspectors proportionally across programs, the preparation of a manual, and the establishment of a risk analysis and profi ling team. As a result of these efforts, spending decreased by $149 million from 2011 to 2012, and 84,000 benefi ciary fi les were cancelled. In 2013, $58 million in resources misspent because of errors and fraud were recovered from benefi ciaries.
universal transfers are simulated to have similar impacts on a poverty index (Kakwani, Veras Soares, and Son 2005) . Programs that imperfectly target households on the basis of poverty and in which targeting costs 15 percent of administrative costs have been compared in simulations with a universal program in 13 countries in Latin America. Th e simulations indicate that, although poverty targeting tends to deliver higher poverty impacts, categorical targeting (combined with geographical targeting) yields better overall results in low-income countries with widespread pockets of poverty. In Nicaragua, for instance, a categorical program only achieves about the same poverty reduction as an imperfect income-targeted program that costs the same but does not leave out 30 percent of the poor. In contrast, in wealthier and more unequal countries, such as Colombia, the need to transfer larger amounts to a smaller pool of poor benefi ciaries makes an imperfect poverty-targeted system more attractive than categorical targeting (Acosta, Leite, and Rigolini 2011) .
Th e costs of implementing the chosen targeting methodology also infl uence the cost-eff ectiveness of the program. Th ese include administrative costs associated with gathering the information necessary to determine eligibility, the costs of implementing targeting, and the indirect costs of targeting, such as any distortions in benefi ciary behavior to qualify for benefi ts and the burden on benefi ciaries (Samsen, van Niekerk, and Mac Quene 2011; Slater and Farrington 2009 ). Th ese costs are not oft en calculated, so it is impossible to carry out an empirical analysis comparing the additional costs of targeting. Diff erent targeting mechanisms imply various costs and levels of accuracy. Proxy-means-testing and hybrid mechanisms, such as the combination of community-based mechanisms and proxy-means-testing, are oft en costly to administer, but are relatively eff ective at excluding both the nonpoor and the poor, thereby increasing effi ciency by decreasing leakage, but at the cost of substantial errors of exclusion (Brown, Ravallion, and van de Walle 2016; Karlan and Th uysbaert 2013) .
Targeting aff ects the political acceptability of programs, which aff ects the willingness to allocate budgets to programs (chapter 3; Gelbach and Pritchett 2002) . Treating budgets as fi xed is therefore a simplistic approach. Depending on the country, there might be more or less support for poverty targeting versus universal or categorical targeting, and that choice might ultimately impact the total amount of resources. Choosing a politically unpalatable option (a narrow poverty-targeted program in a context of strong preferences for a broader or categorical program) might result in fewer resources available for the poor. Th e cost-eff ectiveness of targeting will therefore greatly depend on the country context, the methodology chosen, and the available technologies. Governments would therefore benefi t from carefully choosing strategies on the ways to focus spending on the desired benefi ciaries on the basis of eff ectiveness, but also equity within the wider political context.
A Focus on Programs Th at Have a Proven Impact on Stated Objectives
The effectiveness of social safety nets depends heavily on program choice and design. Indeed, even programs that have a poverty reduction mandate could have limited poverty reduction effects if their coverage of the poor is limited, they are poorly targeted, the amounts are too small, or there is a narrow causal link between the intervention and poverty reduction. Evidence on the effectiveness of alternative program choices, design, and implementation arrangements can help policy makers make effective choices (chapter 2).
Energy subsidies are an example of programs that have often been launched with a poverty mandate, but have weak poverty impacts because they tend to benefit the better off in society. Energy subsidies are typically regressive because large shares of benefits accrue to richer households that have the highest levels of consumption (Inchauste and Victor 2017) . A number of countries have phased out or reduced energy subsidies in favor of social safety net programs that target the poor and vulnerable, thereby achieving stronger poverty impacts or fiscal savings. A key aspect of successful reforms has often been the parallel creation or expansion of social safety net programs as a compensation measure. For instance, in Iran in 2010, the government began a large energy subsidy reform, undertaking extensive public communication and using cash transfers as a means to compensate people for the loss of the subsidies. As a result, the reform had positive effects on poverty, inequality, and overall costs (Guillaume, Zytek, and Farzin 2011; Inchauste and Victor 2017) . The government of the Dominican Republic adopted a similar approach, replacing an electricity subsidy with a targeted cash transfer to help poor households pay for the first 100 kilowatts of electricity each month. The effort was associated with an extensive community sensitization campaign, as well as the rehabilitation of electrical lines to guarantee access. The number of registered electricity users rose from 1.4 million to 2.3 million in three years, and the government achieved considerable savings, with annual costs of $150 million for the subsidy, versus $55 million for the cash transfer program (Inchauste and Victor 2017) .
Overall, choosing programs with greater impact potential and selecting design features that maximize impacts are critical ways to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of social safety net spending. (Chapter 2 discussed some of the design features which are more likely to yield strong impacts on poverty and human development outcomes.) Instruments such as public expenditure reviews and distributional program analyses can greatly help assess how resources are being spent and their impact on poverty and other outcomes.
Securing Sustainable Resources to Expand and Sustain Coverage
While improving the effi ciency and eff ectiveness of programs can bring gains, most countries in Africa will need to increase the amount of resources going to social safety nets to expand coverage to the poor and vulnerable, as well as create systems to make fi nancing available to scale up coverage during crises. Th is section provides a broad overview of how governments can achieve this. Th e section focuses on ways to strengthen fi scal policy as a cornerstone to increasing government revenue, as well as options for alternative fi nancing sources.
Th e literature on these themes abounds and extends well beyond social protection. For this reason, this section is not meant to be an exhaustive, in-depth discussion on these issues. Rather, it is meant to provide food for thought for policy makers on possible avenues to increase and strengthen fi nancing.
Implement Measures to Boost Domestic Revenue
As with all government functions, strengthening fi scal policy is a cornerstone of the sustainable fi nancing of social safety nets at scale. Given the uncertainties in the global macroeconomic and political context, the rising costs of borrowing, and the unpredictability of external fi nancing, domestic revenue mobilization is the most durable way to create fi scal space (IMF 2015) . An improved fi scal system also benefi ts the consolidation of the citizen-state compact and promotes the accountability of government to taxpaying citizens.
"Eff ective tax systems can be associated with a 'virtuous circle,'" writes Bastagli (2016, 22) , "whereby the generation of government tax revenues leads to improved service provision, which in turn increases citizens' willingness to pay taxes." Th e reform of tax policy can also enhance overall governance. Expanding a country's domestic resource mobilization is likely to be politically feasible and sustainable only if it is associated with improved rule-of-law, accountability, and transparency standards (World Bank 2017b).
Th ere is scope to increase the domestic fi scal envelope through increased taxation (IMF 2015; OECD 2017) . At current GDP levels, the median country in Africa is estimated to have the potential to increase tax revenue by between 3.0 and 6.5 percentage points of GDP (IMF 2015) . Given that average spending on social safety nets in the region is 1.2 [[12] ] percent of GDP, such potential increases in tax revenue would allow at least a doubling of social safety net spending on average and still leave room for additional spending in other sectors. In Africa, total tax revenues stood at an average of about 21 percent of GDP between 2011 and 2014, compared with over 30 percent in high-income countries. While still comparatively low, this represents a remarkable improvement. Th e region has experienced the largest increase in tax revenue in the world since the turn of the millennium (IMF 2015) . With the exception of Botswana, Nigeria, Zambia, and a few fragile states, all African countries have managed to increase their tax-to-GDP ratio. Th is improvement partially refl ects the lower starting point of Africa. Even so, progress in the median low-income country in the region was still greater despite a higher starting point than the median lowincome country elsewhere in the world. Th e largest contribution to the average change in tax revenue was provided by taxes on income, profi ts, and capital gains, as well as taxes on goods and services (IMF 2015) .
Finding the balance between direct and indirect taxes and determining the overall level of taxes are crucial to boosting domestic revenue eff ectively and equitably (IMF 2017) . Th e share of direct taxes-such as income, property, and corporate taxes-in overall tax revenue has traditionally been lower in developing countries, refl ecting low per capita incomes, administrative challenges, and the political hurdles of taxing the rich and local elites. However, given their progressive nature and relatively low starting base, direct taxes have the potential to be eff ective instruments for revenue mobilization (World Bank 2017b). Improvements in tax administration, compliance, and formalization can help boost the revenue from direct taxes. At the same time, while oft en dismissed as regressive, indirect taxation-such as value added taxes-presents an opportunity for more revenue than other tax instruments in many African countries in the short term (IMF 2015) . Th is is because its overall eff ect on distribution can be progressive if it is used to fi nance strongly progressive spending (Bastagli 2015) . Furthermore, a shift from labor to consumption taxes (value added taxes, excise taxes, and so on) could boost formal labor demand by lowering nonwage labor costs, which is paramount in light of the emerging potential negative employment impact of automation (Alesina, Battisti, and Zeira 2015; Kuddo and Weber 2017; Santos 2017) . Indirect taxes can be implemented with a broad base, a fairly high threshold to avoid overburdening small businesses, and a single or limited number of rates to preserve simplicity and limit opportunities for rent seeking (IMF 2015) . Concerns over the regressive burden of indirect taxes can also be mitigated by design options, including ensuring that taxes on the goods most oft en consumed by the poor are low (Bastagli 2016) .
Improved tax administration and simplifi ed tax systems are a fundamental pillar in increasing tax revenue and have contributed signifi cantly to increasing fi scal revenue in a number of countries. In Rwanda, the government raised tax revenue by approximately 50 percent between 2001 and 2013 by establishing a revenue authority to cover nontax revenue and rationalize income taxation; introducing a value added tax; aligning the tax system with development priorities; introducing tax audits, appeals, and penalties for evasion; and harmonizing the domestic system with the system of the East African Community (IMF 2009). Th rough the expansion in tax revenues, the government was able to increase spending on infrastructure, education, health care, and social protection (AfDB 2010). In South Africa in 2009, the government simplifi ed the tax revenue system by introducing a turnover tax on microbusinesses, the value added tax, the provisional tax, the capital gains tax, and the dividends tax. Th e additional revenue generated through the introduction of the turnover tax allowed the government to maintain the country's large social safety net system.
Innovative research points to the potential impact that behavioral nudging mechanisms can have on increasing tax compliance across the globe, including in Africa. Field experiments have been conducted around the world over the past few years to test mechanisms-such as reminders, messages, or welldesigned default options-to incentivize taxpayers to pay their taxes, based on the concept that people evade taxes not only because of the expected net benefi t of evading but also because of social and moral considerations (Kettle et al. 2016; Mascagni 2017) . Social norms are more eff ective if tax evasion is perceived as an exception and if compliance is considered the norm. Th is is where the image of the tax administration plays an important role (World Bank 2017b). As a pioneer in Africa, the Rwanda Revenue Authority generated almost $9 million in additional revenue by sending messages to tax payers regarding their taxes. Messages highlighting the importance of tax payments for public services and reminders about deadlines were more eff ective than messages focused on deterrence and emphasizing sanctions and penalties for noncompliance, and routine mailings outperformed more expensive letters in promoting increases in declared taxes (ICTD 2016; Mascagni, Nell, and Monkam 2017) . While the validity of these type of interventions in other African countries has yet to be explored, this is a promising avenue for governments to follow, hand in hand with other policies.
Formalization can boost overall tax revenue, but evidence on the progress and future potential of this phenomenon for fi scal policy is mixed. Informality entails a loss in budget revenues by reducing the payment of taxes and social security contributions and, accordingly, the provision of public goods and services (Kuddo and Weber 2017) . Formalization can be promoted by cutting the cost of compliance and regulation by simplifying administrative processes, enhancing the perceived benefi ts of formalization, and supplying a comprehensive package of support to fi rms, such as through training, support in opening business bank accounts, and help in dealing with tax authorities and tax mediation services. 2 However, overall progress in the formalization of employment across the world has been slow, and emerging trends point to the need to rethink traditional fi scal mechanisms such as payroll-based systems (Kuddo and Weber 2017; Palacios 2017) . Th e share of people of working age contributing to formal social security systems in developing countries has not increased signifi cantly over the past 20 years. At the same time, there has been a shift in many countries toward shorter-term employment, more fragmented careers, and a progressive deindustrialization process, suggesting that emerging economies might not follow the same path of industrialization and experience a premature deindustrialization (Palacios 2017; Rodrik 2016) . Th ese developments point to the need for government leaders of developing countries to think innovatively about fi scal strategy.
Technological progress can off er new opportunities for the collection of tax revenue in this context because governments will be able to track and tax earnings and incomes without the need for payroll-based systems. Th e impressive innovations in digital payments and e-commerce across the world, but especially in Africa and Asia, over the last 15 years, combined with inclusion, are eff ectively formalizing large parts of economies by opening these transactions as a new source of contribution collection with minimal transaction costs (Palacios 2017) . Digital, unique identifi cation systems and linked administrative datasets could allow governments to more eff ectively target fi scal policies, such as negative income taxes or subsidies, and to tailor contributions to income levels (Palacios 2017) . Given the challenges developed countries might face in reforming or eliminating well-established but obsolete tax systems and their legacies, governments across Africa can potentially leapfrog developed countries in adopting innovative fi scal instruments.
Governments can also explicitly link a specifi c tax revenue source to social safety net fi nancing to help establish a predictable and accountable domestic funding source for social safety nets. In Ghana, a share of value added tax and payroll tax revenues is earmarked to fi nance the country's National Health Insurance System, improving the consistency of health fi nancing and increasing spending on health care. Th ere is debate about whether earmarking tax revenue for specifi c sectors is desirable (World Bank 2017b). In general, the literature agrees that appropriate levels of taxation of some temptation goods, such as alcohol or tobacco, can be used to fi nance social sector spending directly. In low-and middle-income countries, tax rates on such undesirable goods are relatively modest, and there is large scope for heavier taxation (World Bank 2017b). Raising taxes on tobacco products is a cost-eff ective measure that reduces consumption of products that lead to premature mortality, while generating substantial revenue for health care and other social programs (Savedoff and Alwang 2015; World Bank 2017b) . Th rough tobacco tax reform, Moldova raised the value of tobacco taxes from 1 percent to 6 percent of total taxes from 2009 to 2016. Armenia has rapidly increased tobacco taxes, reaching 1 percent of GDP. Th e Philippines boosted tobacco tax revenues by a factor of 1.5 in three years, and this was used to increase the health care budget and the number of people receiving health subsidies (World Bank 2017c).
In resource-rich countries, one option is the use of natural resource revenue to fi nance human capital investment, including direct dividend payments, that is, cash transfers (de la Brière et al. 2017; Devarajan and Giugale 2013) . Historically, reliance on natural resource revenues has been associated with volatility, instability, and fi nancing sustainability concerns, as well as possible lower government accountability before citizens because the revenues are unearned (Bastagli 2016) . Some countries have avoided the resource curse and eff ectively promoted long-run development by pursuing a balanced approach that includes investment in human capital (de la Brière et al. 2017) . In Mongolia, for instance, the government has levied royalty rates of 5 percent on the extraction of natural resources, applied a 10 percent corporate income tax on profi ts, and established royalties and licensing fees for exploration and production. A fund was created using such revenues to fi nance expenditures on health insurance and pensions, housing payments, cash transfers, and medical and education service payments (ILO 2016) . Direct dividend payments could present an opportunity to avoid the resource curse by "using cash transfers to hand the money directly to citizens and thereby protect the social contract between the government and its people" (Devarajan and Giugale 2013, ii) . Th e authors' estimates suggest that a country with a large natural resource base relative to population size would be able to provide citizens with considerable cash transfers fi nanced directly through resource revenues. Angola, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea could close the poverty gap by distributing 10 percent of resource revenues in cash transfers. Less resource-rich or more highly populated countries would be able to cover less, but still a considerable share of the poverty gap, such as Nigeria (39 percent) and Tanzania (26 percent).
Curtailing illicit fi nancial fl ows-that is, capital associated with illegal activities or money that crosses borders that has been illegally earned, transferred, or used-can also help governments raise additional resources for social safety nets (World Bank 2016b). Illicit fi nancial fl ows include traded goods that are mispriced to avoid tariff s, wealth transferred to off shore accounts to evade income taxes, and unreported movements of cash. In 2012, almost $1 trillion in illicit fi nancial fl ows were estimated to have been drained from developing countries, and these fl ows amounted to almost 10 times the total aid received by developing countries (Kar, Cartwright-Smith, and Hollingshead 2010; Ortiz, Cummins, and Karunanethy 2015) .
Attracting Alternative Resources
While it is a fundamental instrument, fi scal policy alone may not supply the fi nancing needed to take social safety nets to scale in Africa. Governments can therefore also seek alternative funding sources. An assessment of Ethiopia's taxation and social protection system fi nds that it does not have the capacity to achieve the desired level of redistribution by applying higher marginal rates on relatively high incomes, nor to close the poverty gap or fully fund the main social safety net program using domestic income sources alone (Hirvonen, Mascagni, and Roelen 2016) . Development partner fi nancing is an obvious option that already plays an important role in fi nancing social protection spending. It is particularly strategic in fi nancing initial investments in the sector, for instance, in establishing the building blocks for delivery. It can also be a catalyst for gathering domestic resources for social protection. In Mozambique, development partners were key in advocating for an increase in budget allocations for the social protection strategy and plan (Bastagli 2015) . Responsibility for fi nancing can gradually shift to governments once initial investments have been made and country systems are in place. Th e fi nancing and implementation of social safety nets have gradually been taken over by the governments of Ethiopia, Lesotho, and Senegal (box 5.4). Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) is an example of the successful integration of government and development partner funding, as well as of development partner harmonization. Eleven development partners coalesced and created eff ective implementation arrangements that span multiple ministries and now provide a unifi ed stream of technical advice in support of the government-led program (Monchuk 2014) .
Other options include development impact bonds, which are innovative tools that governments can use to mobilize private sector fi nancing for development objectives, including those of social safety nets. Development impact bonds "provide funding for development programs by private investors, who are remunerated by development partners or host-country governments-and earn a return-if evidence shows that programs achieve pre-agreed outcomes" (CGD and Social Finance 2013) . Th e returns to investment are contingent on the achievement of the envisaged development objectives (Coleman 2016) . Th e principle of this approach is that socially motivated private investors provide upfront funding for a development program. Development impact bonds are the developing-country adaptation of social impact bonds, which are used in higherincome countries to promote socially desirable results, mostly in the areas of criminal justice, homelessness, and the workforce. Most development bonds are still at the design stage, but early lessons are emerging (Gustafsson-Wright and Gardiner 2016; Gustafsson-Wright, Gardiner, and Putcha 2015) .
Diaspora bonds could also be used to direct remittances toward development goals. Th ey are debt instruments issued by a government to raise fi nancing from its diaspora (Ketkar and Ratha 2007) . Th e bonds are long-dated securities that may be redeemed only upon maturity. Typically, investors who purchase diaspora bonds are motivated by a desire to contribute to the development of their country of origin. Diaspora bonds have been successfully introduced in India, Israel, and Nigeria. Th rough such bonds, the State Bank of India had raised over $11 billion by 2007, while Nigeria issued $100 million in diaspora bonds in 2013, and, given the success of the fi rst issue, decided to raise €300 million from a second diaspora bond issue under the 2016-18 borrowing plan (Ketkar and Ratha 2007; Ozaki 2016) . 
How Senegal Finances Most of Its Main Social Safety Net Programs
In the mid-2000s, social safety net spending in Senegal was low, around 0.4 percent of GDP in 2004. Social safety net funding was largely dependent on development partner fi nancing. Of the nine programs on which there is funding information, development partners fi nanced 62 percent of costs (World Bank 2013). Since then, however, government spending on social safety nets has increased signifi cantly (fi gure B5.4.1). This follows the adoption by the government of its fl agship conditional cash transfer program as a key element of the 2012 national development strategy. Government leadership has helped mobilize substantial national resources, and development partners now mostly focus on supporting the development of tools, instruments, and systems. Corporate social responsibility (CSR), relative to other social sectors and regions, might be an underutilized source for fi nancing social safety nets in Africa. A few governments have developed strategies and tools to access these resources to fund economic and development strategies. In El Salvador, multinational companies have supported the creation of two major foundations in education and in broader socioeconomic development. In Mauritius, the Ministry of Finance requested that all fi rms spend 2 percent of their profi ts on CSR activities approved by the government or transfer the funds to the government to be used for social and environmental projects. Some elements required for CSR to bring additional funding for social safety net programs in Africa include (1) placing social protection on the global business development agenda as a sector of CSR activity, (2) building government leadership in the development of CSR within countries, (3) developing a national CSR strategy among public sector companies, (4) ensuring that CSR activities are aligned with the development objectives of social safety nets to maximize synergy, and (5) defi ning the needs in social safety nets that can be eff ectively addressed by CSR activities and resources (Forstater et al. 2010; GIZ 2012; Visser and Tolhurst 2010) .
Developing a Financing Strategy for a Reliable, Effective Emergency Response
Current financing strategies to manage crises, including humanitarian support and commercial insurance, cover only a fraction of disaster losses, creating a protection gap that leaves many of the vulnerable exposed. Only around 30 percent of catastrophe losses have been covered by insurance over the past 10 years, which means that close to 70 percent of catastrophe losses have been borne directly by individuals, firms, and governments (Swiss Re 2016). Furthermore, humanitarian assistance is struggling to keep up with growing needs. Almost half the humanitarian appeals of the United Nations were left unmet in 2016 (UNHCR 2017). Finances are strained, and the status quo in financing for disaster response may suffer because of delays in mobilization, during which livelihoods suffer, particularly those of the poor.
To manage the risk of shocks eff ectively, ensure predictable and timely access to resources, and ultimately mitigate long-term fi scal impacts, many governments are adopting a strategic approach to disaster risk fi nancing that relies on a range of preplanned, prenegotiated fi nancial instruments. In a number of countries in Africa, these disaster risk fi nancing strategies and shock-responsive social safety nets are being developed or considered. Th is builds on several global initiatives that seek to improve the fi nancial resilience of low-and middle-income countries. Th ere is growing interest in the international community to build the fi nancial resilience of such countries, which is evidenced by the multiple global initiatives. Th e most relevant for Africa is the G7's German-presidency-sponsoreds InsuResilience Initiative, which looks to expand climate risk insurance to an additional 400 million poor and vulnerable people in these nations by 2020.
Disaster risk fi nancing involves planning ahead and mobilizing resources to fi nance shock-responsive activities before the impacts of the shock aff ect households. Emerging evidence on this approach is promising, demonstrating significant cost savings over the status quo. In Ethiopia, every $1.00 secured beforehand for early drought response can save up to $5.00 in future costs, and well-targeted early interventions in slow-onset disasters, such as droughts, cost a fraction of emergency aid aft er a famine develops (Clarke and Hill 2013; Hess, Wiseman, and Robertson 2007) .
Contingency or reserve funds have been established in many countries to fi nance relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and prevention activities associated with national emergencies. Funds specifi cally dedicated to disaster response exist in Colombia, Costa Rica, India, Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Marshall Islands, Mexico, the Philippines, and Vietnam. In the Philippines, the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund fi nances a range of disaster-related expenditures, but is not able to disburse rapidly in response to a crisis. For that reason, the government created the Quick Response Fund, which focuses on emergency response. In Mexico, FONDEN was created as a budgetary tool to allocate federal funds rapidly for emergency response and the rehabilitation of public infrastructure aff ected by disasters. A number of African countries are working on the establishment of similar funds. In Kenya, the government is in the fi nal stages of operationalizing a national contingency fund dedicated to drought emergencies. Eff orts are also under way to create such funds in Madagascar and Mozambique.
Contingent fi nancing consists of fi nancial instruments designed to off er countries access to liquidity prior to or immediately following an exogenous shock, such as a terms-of-trade shock, fi nancial shock, or natural disaster. Contingent loans have been used by multilateral development banks to strengthen national capacities in risk management and supply countries with access to liquidity immediately following an exogenous shock. Th ese instruments promote early responses, which can help mitigate the risks of exacerbating crisis situations and reduce overall costs.
Risk transfer financial instruments enable governments to transfer the risk of specific meteorological or geological events (droughts, hurricanes, earthquakes, and floods) or commodity price shocks to actors in the market (insurance companies, reinsurance companies, banks, and investors) that are willing to accept them. These market-based risk transfer products use scientific information and actuarial modeling to estimate losses that would be sustained because of a specific event and price the risk. Payments are triggered by the performance of a prespecified, underlying parametric index, such as levels of rainfall, length and intensity of drought, or commodity price movements. Risk transfer products can be implemented in various forms, including direct access to insurance, reinsurance, and capital markets (derivative contracts or catastrophe bonds or indirect access through a dedicated vehicle such as a catastrophe risk pool) (World Bank 2017d). Catastrophe risk pools create a platform that allows governments to take a collective and standard approach to quantitative analysis and modeling, improve information sharing, coordinate response, lower the costs of coverage (through the pooling of diverse exposures, the retention of some risk, and the transfer of excess risks to capital and reinsurance markets), and strengthen subregional and regional cooperation and policy dialogue. Examples include the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility, the Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative facility, and African Risk Capacity. Governments can also purchase indemnity insurance for public assets, such as buildings and other key infrastructure. This, however, is not typically an approach used to deal with risk and secure reliable financing for social safety nets.
Each instrument serves different purposes and the frequency and severity of the risks to be managed vary by country. Hence, governments should to take a strategic approach-possibly combining or layering instruments. Such an approach prioritizes cheaper sources of funding, ensuring that the most expensive instruments are only used in exceptional circumstances. Insurance may be cost-effective to cover extreme events (though it could be prohibitively expensive in countries frequently affected by extreme events), but it may be inefficient and costly in the case of low-intensity, recurring events. For such disasters, a dedicated contingency fund may be a more appropriate solution. Figure 5 .3 provides a graphic representation of this risk-layering approach. Combining instruments also enables governments to take into account the evolving needs for funds, from emergency response to long-term reconstruction. For instance, a government could decide to purchase (ex ante) quick-disbursing risk transfer instruments to ensure immediate liquidity just before or in the aftermath of extreme events, but raise the larger sums required to finance reconstruction efforts through (ex post) budget reallocations or by issuing bonds.
In addition to natural disasters, social safety nets can play a central role during economic contractions. In the face of macroeconomic shocks, the demand for social safety nets typically rises, while governments must operate on tighter budgets. During these times, social safety net spending needs to be protected and even increased to prevent the long-lasting negative impacts of the lack of protection for the poor. Several countries have made efforts in this direction. Thus, the government of Ghana set targets for social safety net spending to mitigate the impact of fiscal consolidation under its arrangements with the International Monetary Fund in 2015-18.
Governments in Africa must find the appropriate financing mix to ensure that social safety nets are funded sustainably and that resources are available if and when needed both for permanent programs and for emergency responses. Each option explored in this chapter has advantages and disadvantages (table 5. 2), which largely depend on country contexts. Governments can fund a larger share of the social safety net over the medium term through a range of efficiency improvements, strengthened domestic revenue, leveraging alternative financial sources, and using risk financing mechanisms. 
Fi gure 5.3 Governments Can Layer Financing Instruments That Address Different Needs
Financing methods Advantages Challenges
Increased effi ciency in administration of social safety nets
Creates fi scal space without raising taxes; increases acceptability of social safety nets Implementation of administrative reforms can be diffi cult; the amount saved is often insuffi cient to fi nance the effort of brining programs to scale
Reallocation of expenditures toward desired benefi ciaries and goals
Creates fi scal space without raising taxes; can increase the productivity of government outlays and effi ciency by reducing unproductive expenditures; can increase the acceptability of public spending, depending on the social contract and expectations; feasible in the short term on a small scale, particularly if low-hanging fruit can be identifi ed Requires signifi cant commitment by the government to implement changes and face trade-offs; requires detailed analysis of public expenditure programs and medium-term commitments by the government; may imply winners and losers among previous and new benefi ciaries, leading to potential political discontent Boosting domestic revenue Most sustainable option in the medium to long expenditures; may have a positive redistributive effect depending on balance in the tax mix; increases the overall productivity of the government if it is achieved through improvements in tax administration, compliance, or design; potentially improves the transparency of resource revenues Tax reforms can be diffi cult to implement administratively and politically; higher taxation may have direct and indirect effects on economic growth and the poor: needs to be designed well; tax increase may produce limited returns, given the narrow fi scal base, and may be politically unpopular Leveraging alternative resources Development partners can provide fi nancing in the short and medium terms; usually associated with technical assistance for the design of reforms; innovative instruments (for example, development impact bonds) can be sustainable mechanisms for long-term fi nancing Cyclicality of funding and downward trend can imply unreliable development partner or private sector fi nancing; bureaucratic or policy requirements may hinder government ownership; development partner coordination may be a challenge; long-term performance of innovative instruments has yet to be tested Tools for crisis fi nancing Different risk-fi nancing instruments are available to cover risks that vary in frequency and severity
Choice among instruments requires careful risk assessment and fi nancial planning during normal times (risk-layering strategy)
